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State Tax Credits for Private Start-Up Capital: 
Arching Toward Urban “Entrepreneurial 
Redevelopment” 
Kyle R. Williams* 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic redevelopment of modern urban areas into vibrant 
headquarters of city culture is as intriguing to describe as it is to 
witness. The modern American city stands as a sheer monolith to the 
accumulation of history, culture, wealth, and imagination of its 
residents. More importantly, it represents to the local community a 
display of the diverse resources that were required to organize and 
build it and as landmark to important local traditions and endeavors. 
However, with the advent of suburbanization, many individuals who 
once knew only city living left the urban inner city for the less central 
and more communalized pockets of suburban America.  
In the wake of the population’s departure, once-powerful 
downtown urban areas became economic ghost towns.1 Social and 
economic reform programs are slow to redress the situation because 
of the widespread lack of resources necessary to rebuild after such a 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2001, Washington University School of Law.  
 1. E. Scott Golden,  Note, Enterprise Zones: New Life for the Inner City, 4 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 243, 248-49 (1981) (quoting John F. Kain, The Distribution and Movement of Jobs 
and Industry, in THE METROPOLITAN ENIGMA : INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE AND DIMENSIONS 
OF AMERICA’S “URBAN CRISES” 1, 10-15 (J. Wilson ed., 1967)).  
By any measure metropolitan growth, since World War II, has been rapid but unevenly 
distributed. Outlying portions of metropolitan areas have been growing quickly, while 
the central areas have been growing very little and, in an increasing number of 
instances, have actually declined . . .. Losses in retail sales and property values, 
declining profits for central city merchants, and falling tax bases have usually followed 
from these employment and population declines. 
Id. at 249. See also  Alan M. White, Note, Gentrification, Tipping and the National Housing 
Policy, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255 (1982). 
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daunting collapse.2 However, partly due to years of intensive and 
concentrated economic development efforts aimed at revitalizing the 
inner cities, the population has begun to return. 3 Why are people and 
businesses returning to the urban centers? No one simple explanation 
exists, and one will not be attempted here.4 Most commentators agree 
that for both businesses and city dwellers, economic redevelopment 
programs continue to have at least some desirable effect on the trend 
of return to the cities. In Missouri, and St. Louis in particular, city 
residents and businesses are experiencing such an “urban 
renaissance.”5 Not surprisingly, at the forefront of this renaissance is 
the small business owner.6 
This Note discusses the concept of “entrepreneurial 
redevelopment,” a strategy implicit in modern urban economic 
development planning. 7 Entrepreneurial redevelopment is introduced 
 
 2. See William S. Paddock, Note, Tax and Other Legal Aspects of Business Involvement 
in Ghetto Development Programs, 20  CASE W. RES. L. REV. 825, 825 (1969). 
The War on Poverty has failed to provide a solution to the Nation’s urban crisis. The 
discontent and turmoil which continue to emanate from the core areas of our cities 
bear witness to this failure. Conventional welfare programs based on the handout are a 
mere palliative for the underlying economic and social causes of chronic poverty. The 
dole is demeaning; it tends to promote economic dependence rather than afford the 
disadvantaged an opportunity for becoming productive citizens . . .. With characteristic 
inefficiency, the faceless bureaucracy has hindered effective implementation of 
existing programs, while legislative laggardness has inhibited the development of new 
and innovative approaches to the urban poverty problem. It is in this perspective of 
general governmental failure that critics have called for increased involvement of 
private industry in the effort to eradicate poverty and blight from the cities.  
Id.  
 3. See Robin Paul Malloy, The Political Economy of Co-Financing America’s Urban 
Renaisance, 40 VAND. L. REV. 67, 67 (1987).  
America’s urban centers are experiencing a renaissance of sorts that reflects the 
vitality of a renewed interest in the city. Dynamic growth and revitalization of the 
central city have emerged since the 1970s as key focal points for investment and 
development . . . [S]ome central cities are said to be transforming into entirely new 
urban environments where people not only work, but live, shop, and entertain. 
Id. 
 4. See id. at 68-69. In general, the return to urban living “involves the recognition that 
cities are a necessary, if not sufficient, basis for fueling long-term economic growth, job 
creation, and capital formation.” Id. at 68. 
 5. Id. at 67.  
 6. See infra  Part I. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
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and examined here through a comparative analysis with Missouri’s 
recently enacted Tax Credit For Investments In Missouri Small 
Businesses Act (the “Missouri Act”).8 The Missouri Act employs 
entrepreneurial redevelopment at the state level in the form of an 
outside investor incentive aimed specifically at small business 
investments and small business investors.9 Recognizing, of course, 
that great business ideas often fall far away from the ‘money tree,’ 
the Missouri Act utilizes investors to create the entrepreneurial 
activity necessary to stimulate growth in urban areas. 
Entrepreneurial redevelopment is the targeted use of investor-
specific incentives to initiate and grow small and start-up 
businesses,10 thereby initiating sustainable economic growth in an 
economically depressed urban city. Entrepreneurial redevelopment 
manifests itself in the form of direct and indirect assistance and 
incentives to investors in order to support small and start-up 
businesses in the early years of new business activity. Entrepreneurial 
redevelopment exclusively uses local entrepreneurs to begin 
redeveloping the economic and business base of a depressed urban 
city. The focus of entrepreneurial redevelopment is specific and 
narrowly limited to initiating small and start-up businesses. Once a 
viable economic base is established and supported by sustained 
entrepreneurial activity, additional economic development programs 
and tax incentives are better able to provide larger-scale, even 
manufacturing-level, urban development.  
Entrepreneurial redevelopment is not an effort to subsidize 
already-failing larger and mid-sized businesses or to encourage a 
start-up business to relocate to a different location from outside of the 
urban region. 11 Entrepreneurial redevelopment is an effort to start 
additional businesses within the region, using the flexibility and 
 
 8. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 135.400-.430 (Supp. 1999). 
 9. See infra  Part I. 
 10. ‘Small business’, ‘start -up business’, and ‘Missouri small business’ are used 
interchangeably and for the purposes of this Note have similar meanings. ‘Start-up business’ is 
used in certain contexts where it is more appropriate to denote the very early phase of growth of 
the business. 
 11. Such programs to attract businesses to locate in another area are commonly known as 
“location incentives.” See, e.g., Andrew Kolesar, Note, Can State and Local Tax Incentives and 
Other Contributions Stimulate Economic Development? , 44 TAX LAW. 285 (1990). 
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agility of small business organizations to take advantage of the 
remaining, but scarce viable resources and opportunities in depressed 
urban areas.  
This genesis is not a novel concept; rather, entrepreneurial 
redevelopment is a concept implicit in other redevelopment 
strategies.12 Current economic stimulus projects already use small 
businesses and start-ups as catalysts for growth. 13 Entrepreneurial 
redevelopment to date has neither been employed on a large or 
unrestricted scale, nor monitored as a specific and purposeful 
development strategy itself. In the urban economic development 
context, entrepreneurial redevelopment typically precedes other 
successfully implemented redevelopment strategies and responds to 
community and small business needs.  
Part I of this Note introduces Missouri’s innovative response to 
the challenge of urban redevelopment.14 Part I will describe the 
Missouri Act in detail, first on a functional level and then on a policy 
level. Next, Part II will introduce the Enterprise Zone and provide an 
overview of the Missouri Act’s problematic operational and policy 
effects by way of comparison to Enterprise Zones.15 Part III describes 
the conflicting statutory enactments and policy objectives between 
Enterprise Zones and the Missouri Act. Part III also discusses the 
pivotal “fixed pool” assumption, as embodied in the Missouri Act, 
and explores and details this assumption as it affects Missouri’s 
implemented redevelopment strategy.16 Part III then presents 
arguments for rejecting the “fixed pool” assumption in the Missouri 
Act.17 In conclusion, this Note recommends a less restrictive ‘free-
market’ clause to fully initialize entrepreneurial redevelopment, 
 
 12. See infra  notes 87-94 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra  Part II. 
 14. See supra note 7. 
 15. Part II specifically addresses Enterprise Zones and does not address other 
redevelopent programs. The programs that are not addressed include the following: “sales and 
use tax exemptions, a wage credit for job creation, an employer income tax credit, a credit for 
hiring certain disadvantaged workers, property tax reduction or abatement, . . . investment 
credit for real improvements, . . . venture capital funds, tax increment financing, direct state 
loans, regulatory relief, and infrastructure improvement assistance.” David Williams, II, The 
Enterprise Zone Concept at the Federal Level: Are Proposed Tax Incentives the Needed 
Ingredient?, 9 VA. TAX REV. 711, 720-21 (1990). 
 16. See infra  Part III. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
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reversing the current ‘fixed-pool’ statutory assumption and its stifling 
ramifications.18 
I. THE MISSOURI ACT: AN INNOVATIVE FIRST STEP ON THE ROAD TO 
ENTREPRENEURIAL REDEVELOPMENT 
Commentators note that there is a renewed interest in the 
revitalization and redevelopment of urban areas in the United 
States.19 While suburban areas continue to grow with the population 
rate, the recent growth in many urban downtown areas has been 
attributed primarily to a demand for newer urban environments and 
urban living. 20 The plethora of start-up opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and small business owners in these downtown urban 
areas partly causes this urban economic “phenomenon.”21 Urban 
areas are typically rich in raw business resources and provide a 
supportive environment to develop small and start-up businesses.22 
Thus, the recent drive to resurrect many of the country’s downtown 
areas presents a clear opportunity for entrepreneurs and small start-up 
business owners to act as catalysts and leaders in the resurgence of 
these important regions.23 
Missouri’s efforts to develop its flagging downtown urban cities 
culminated with an unusually progressive tax expenditure: the State 
of Missouri Tax Credit for Investments In Missouri Small Businesses 
 
 18. See also, e.g ., Part II. 
 19. Malloy, supra note 3, at 67-68. See also, e.g ., JANE JACOBS, CITIES AND THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS (1984). 
 20. Malloy, supra note 3, at 68 (“Cities provide the closely knit environment necessary 
for the incubation of many small business enterprises.”). “The economic strength of urban 
centers and the extended regions that surround them is essential, not only for improving the 
local standard of living, but for improving regional and national economic prospects as well.” 
Id. 
 21. See Stuart M. Butler, Enterprise Zones: Pioneering in the Inner City, in NEW TOOLS 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE ENTERPRISE ZONE , DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND RFC 25 
(George Sternlieb & David Listokin eds., 1981). Small businesses are able to use local 
resources more efficiently and “[s]mall firms are the most effective creators of jobs in the 
economy, and provide the type of jobs most suitable to the inner city.” Id. 
 22. Malloy, supra note 3, at 68 (noting that “[o]nly in the womb of the urban environment 
can the small business enterprise . . . have access to extensive sources of capital, flexible use of 
technology, [and] close relationships with other similarly innovative firms”). 
 23. Id. at 67-68. 
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Act,24 made effective January 1, 1993.25 The Missouri Act represents 
an effort to stimulate additional small business activity within the 
state with targeted tax expenditures aimed specifically at the early 
stages of a start-up business’ life cycle.26 The Missouri Act provides 
that a “qualified investment”27 into a “Missouri small business”28 
entitles any investor29 to a state tax credit equal to forty percent of the 
gross amount of cash invested by the taxpayer.30 For the small 
business investor, the Missouri Act provides an attractive risk-
reduction incentive to seriously consider adding a local small 
business in Missouri to a diversified investment portfolio.31 For the 
 
 24. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 135.400-.430 (Supp. 1999). 
 25. Id. 
 26. John A. Granda, An Overview of Missouri’s New Seed Capital Tax Credit Legislation , 
49 J. MO. BAR 263, 263 (1993). Generally, as the small business begins to operate and demand 
more working capital than the owners and their families have available to contribute, some sort 
of secondary financing will be acquired, if it has not already been acquired. The Missouri Act 
focuses on this stage of capital financing of the business concern. Id. at 265-67.  
 27. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
 28. § 135.400(8) (Supp. 1999). The Missouri Act broadly defines a “Missouri small 
business” as “an independently owned and operated business . . . which is headquartered in 
Missouri and which employs at least eighty percent of its employees in Missouri . . . involved in 
interstate or intrastate commerce.” Id. The small business must be engaged in one of the 
specifically enumerated industries in order to qualify for the credit. Id. See infra notes 45-49 
and accompanying text. However, there is no requirement that the business be in a particular 
form, i.e., partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or sole proprietorship.  
 29. The Missouri Act defines an “investor” to include “an individual, partnership, 
financial institution, trust or corporation” subject to certain requirements which are not germane 
to this discussion. § 135.400(7) (Supp. 1999). Although the Missouri Act explicitly lists 
corporations as qualified investors able to receive the tax credit, if an investing corporation 
acquires over fifty percent of the ownership of the small business, t he corporation will become 
a “principal owner” and will not be eligible for the credit. § 135.414 (Supp. 1999). The 
Missouri Act explicitly excludes from qualified investor status the principal owner, their 
spouse, and relatives within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity. § 135.414 (Supp. 
1999).  
 30. § 135.403 (Supp. 1999). The Missouri Act also provides a sixty percent tax credit for 
qualified investments into a “Missouri small business in a distressed community,” as that term 
is defined in section 135.530. Further, if the qualified investment is in a “community bank or 
community development corporation,” the tax credit is equal to fifty percent of the amount of 
the investment. Id. “The tax credit may be used to offset the Missouri state income tax liability 
of the investor [or] the Missouri state corporation franchise tax liability of any corporate 
investor [and] . . . [e]xcess credits may be carried forward for ten years.” Granda, supra  note 26, 
at 263. 
 31. In its simplest form, investors may view the amount of state income tax credited to 
them as a cash payment equal to the above-market risk the investor assumed by investing in a 
small business with no proven track record. Granada, supra  note 26, at 263 (“In view of the 
higher risk of loss from investing during the early phases of a small business, it was also 
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entrepreneur seeking a much-needed capital investment into their 
start-up business from investors, the Missouri Act places start-up 
investments on equal footing with less risky, but potentially less 
profitable, investment ventures.32 In essence, the investor assumes 
real additional underlying risk in her investment while 
simultaneously lowering the comparative risk of her investment 
opportunity as compared with other, potentially less profitable, 
ventures. 
The Missouri Act requires the start-up business investor to make a 
“qualified investment”33 in the business in order to be eligible for the 
tax credit.34 For the purpose of the Missouri Act, “qualified 
investments” are basically unsecured cash investments,35 consisting 
of equity or debt securities.36 Unsecured investments are especially 
 
recognized that the additional stimulus provided by tax credits for such investments was needed 
to compensate for that risk.”). Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. MO. REV. STAT. § 135.408 (1994). This section broadly authorizes the small business 
to use the investment dollars for “capital improvements, plant, equipment, research and 
development, or working capital for the business or such business act ivity as may be approved 
by the department.” Id. The Missouri Act does not define “working capital,” and for the 
purposes of this Note it is assumed to incorporate its common usage and meaning. See id. Thus, 
the Missouri Act purportedly authorizes the invested dollars to be spent on wages, leases, and 
incorporation fees such as accountants, attorneys, and insurance agents. Id. 
 34. § 135.403 (Supp. 1999). This requirement and others discussed in this Section are 
enforced through a certificate that is issued from the Missouri Department of Economic 
Development specifying the amount of the tax credit to be given to a particular investor. 
§ 135.426 (1994). The certificate is an important part of the implementation of the Missouri Act 
as it encourages investor/entrepreneur contact in the investigation of the venture and assures 
that the state will have an effective means of tracking the expenditure. See id. 
 35. The Missouri Act specifies only that the “investment” must be “a transaction in which 
a Missouri small business . . . receives a monetary benefit from an investor pursuant to the 
provisions of sections 135.403 to 135.414.” § 135.400(6) (Supp. 1999). Although this Note 
assumes that cash is the primary investment made into start-up businesses, this does not serve to 
undermine the proposition that equipment, plant, real property, and other cash equivalent 
investments may be the subject of the investor’s contribution and still fall within the gamut of 
the Missouri Act. To the author’s knowledge, this proposition, to date, is untested in the 
Missouri courts.  
 36. § 135.408 (1994). Unsecured loans are also a method of financing eligible for the 
Missouri Act’s tax credit. See id.  The Missouri Act further provides that following their 
investment, the investors “must collectively own less than fifty percent of a business after their 
investments are made . . . [and] investments . . . must be expended for capital improvements, 
plant, equipment, research and development, or working capital . . . .” Id. The Missouri Act 
requires that the investments either must be registered or exempt securities, both of which have 
implications as to the total amount of the proceeds from the offering to be used within the state. 
§ 135.416 (1994). However, these implications are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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desirable for a small business because secured lenders often secure a 
large portion of the new business’ property with liens early in the 
business’ life.37 Conversely, in the case of service-related or high-
tech and software-related businesses, the start-up may have 
accumulated little in tangible inventory or capital assets, making 
securitization for a loan nearly impossible.38 Thus, the Missouri Act 
provides that the small business with little or no unencumbered 
collateral may be eligible for outside venture capital financing. 39  
Moreover, the Missouri Act has the desirable side effect of 
requiring local investors to investigate their business investment 
prospects more intently. 40 As small and start-up businesses may not 
make large-scale share offerings, information dissemination will be 
much less widespread and the information often exists in an 
inaccessible form. Consequently, a sound investment may require 
personal communication. The risky nature of an unsecured equity or 
debt interest further fosters the opportunity for information exchange, 
which encourages a heightened owner/investor understanding of the 
business risks involved.41 The Missouri Act mandates a five-year 
 
 37. Granda, supra  note 26, at 266. The Missouri Act protects any assets that are not 
already encumbered by requiring unsecured investments. See infra  note 39. 
In order to preserve those assets, and any assets obtained with the proceeds of the seed 
capital raised through the tax credits, for use as collateral to obtain debt or other 
second-round financing, these conditions prevent the small business from having to 
bargain away that right because of its lack of negotiating leverage. 
Granda, supra note 26, at 266. 
 38. See infra  note 39 and accompanying text. 
 39. The capital investments sought for the tax credit are investments that must be “‘[a]t 
risk, that is, the repayment thereof must be entirely dependent upon the success of the business 
operations.” Granda, supra note 26, at 266. Guidelines promulgated from the committee who 
authored the Missouri Act provide: 
that no collateral of the business or other entity related to the business or its owners 
will be allowed to be held by the investor as security for the permitted investment, 
including personal or corporate guarantees of the principal owners or related persons. 
These requirements recognize that small businesses at this stage of development 
typically have few, if any, tangible assets available to secure payment of or return on 
seed capital. 
Id. 
 40. See, e.g ., § 135.411 (1994). 
 41. The relatio nship between investor and owner can have a significant impact on the 
operation of the business concern, as well as the potential for further investments in the future. 
The relationship that can develop between such investors and owners is “not a pure agency 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/14
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minimum period for the investment, and failure to meet this 
minimum leads to repayment of the tax credit.42 Thus, the minimum 
period provides even greater incentive for the development of an 
understanding between owner and investor.43 In the case of urban 
redevelopment, where crucial business synergies are still in their 
infancy,44 these understandings can play an important role in the 
formation and culturing of the new business community. 45 
The Missouri Act strictly limits eligibility for the tax credit to 
those investments in “Missouri small businesses.”46 The Missouri Act 
requires a “Missouri small business” to be independently owned, 
operated, and located within the state with a maximum of one 
 
relationship, but rather a more complex interaction characterized by give-and-take on both 
sides” and “more akin to a partnership than to the shareholders-manager relationship in a 
modern public corporation.” D. Gordon Smith , Venture Capital Contracting in the Information 
Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 139 (1998). The opposite relationship that may 
evolve when the source of investment is the more traditional investor-owner arrangement is 
aptly described in the context of “moral hazard”: 
The directors of such . . . companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily 
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, 
must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. 
Id. at 137 n.11 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (1776)). 
 42. § 135.411 (1994). 
 43. See id. The Missouri Act effectively creates a five-year relationship between the 
investor and the entrepreneur of co-ownership, as opposed to more generic relationship of 
creditor and debtor. See supra  note 19. 
 44. See, e.g ., Ed Mickens, The City Fights Back–Downtowns on the Rebound, 45 URB. 
LAND, May, 1986, at 11. 
 45. Id. 
 46. § 135.403 (Supp. 1999). Although the requirements are flexible enough to provide 
funding to most typical start-ups, eventually the business will grow to make subsequent 
investments ineligible for tax credits under the Act. For some businesses, commentators and 
economists speculate that the ‘notch problem,’ the point at which the small business outgrows 
the Missouri Act’s eligibility requirements, will discourage growth beyond a certain point. Jane 
G. Gravelle, What Can Private Investment Incentives Accomplish? The Case of the Investment 
Tax Credit, 46 NAT’L TAX J. 275, 286 (1993). However, this concern ignores the presence of 
other redevelopment plans and programs that may better address the intermediate growth needs 
of the business. Further, if the ‘notch problem’ proves serious, legislators may choose to phase 
out eligibility for the credit over time as opposed to an immediate cut -off once business reaches 
a pre-set level of income. See id. 
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hundred employees.47 Under the Missouri Act, a “Missouri small 
business” must be involved in manufacturing, processing, or 
assembling products, or conducting research and development.48 The 
Missouri Act explicitly excludes all retail, real estate, insurance, and 
professional service organizations.49 The industry exclusion 
effectively denies the tax credit and investment incentives otherwise 
provided by the Missouri Act to all restaurants, retail consumer 
stores, and professional consulting services including accountants, 
business consultants, and other professional service-based 
businesses50 in Missouri. 51 By narrowing the scope of the tax credit, 
the industry restriction prevents entrepreneurial redevelopment from 
taking root on the ground plowed by the Missouri Act.52 
Missouri specifies the total amount of tax credits available in a 
given year.53 This approach fully utilizes the flexibility and 
accountability inherent in the tax expenditure54 mechanism.55 
 
 47. § 135.400(8) (Supp. 1999). The Missouri Act  also requires that the business have 
annual revenues of $2 million or less and the principal owner or owners generally must be 
engaged in the operation of the business on a full-time basis. § 135.414. Although the statute’s 
definition of a “Missouri small business” cites federal legislation, the guidelines in the Missouri 
Act offer clearer guidance on the eligibility of the business. § 135.400(8). The Missouri Act 
also requires that the start-up employ at least eighty percent of its employees in Missouri, which 
proves a fairly easy stipulation given the size limitations on businesses to be eligible for the 
credit. Id.  
 48. § 135.400(8) (Supp. 1999). 
 49. Id. 
 50. The apparent rationale for such a broad exclusion is discussed in detail infra  in Part II. 
One commentator noted, quite accurately, that under the Missouri Act: 
Businesses engaged in retail, real estate, or insurance activities or in rendering 
professional services such as accounting and legal services are excluded from the 
permissible scope of activities. The goal of these exclusions is to eliminate certain 
types of business which do not produce a multiplier effect on economic development 
as large as manufacturing or high -tech jobs. Partial justification for these exclusions is 
based on the recognitio n that some of these businesses can utilize hard-assets as 
collateral (such as real estate development) or are not as capital intensive (such as 
professional services). 
Granda, supra  note 26, at 265. 
 51. § 135.400(8) (Supp. 1999). 
 52. The Missouri Act’s industry restriction is examined infra  in Part III. For now, it is 
sufficient to note its general effect on the overall operation of the statutory scheme. 
 53. § 135.403 (Supp. 1999). As of 1999, the total tax expenditure was capped at $13 
million. Since the enactment of the Missouri Act there have been several upward adjustments of 
the funding ceiling. Id. 
 54. A tax expenditure, in contrast with a direct grant of taxing revenue for a government 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/14
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Missouri also limits the total amount of tax credit eligibility for 
individual investors although the ceiling does not restrict the total 
amount of investment that can be made in the small business.56 The 
Missouri Act’s tax expenditure is relatively straightforward to 
employ and administer, and it safeguards against abuse.57  
The social and economic justifications for this government-
spending tool make this device especially formidable in the arena of 
economic development.58 Although other strategies stimulate market 
 
purpose, is defined generally as an exclusion, deduction, or credit that “reduce[s] the tax 
liability otherwise applicable by adopting a special exclusion, deduction, or the like for the 
favored activity or group.” STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 
(1985). “[A] general reduction of tax rates would not be a tax expenditure—though it would be 
relief from taxes.” Id. at 4. Tax expenditures, although viewed sometimes as ‘tax loopholes’ and 
‘tax preferences’, are really government ‘spending programs.’” Id. at 25-26. See, e.g., Koelsar, 
supra  note 11, at 295-96 (noting that “tax incentives are tantamount to a spending program” and 
“tax incentives are politically expedient because they appear to be less costly than other 
spending programs.”). 
 55. Although relevant to the effectiveness of the Missouri Act, this Note will not address 
the constitutional aspects of tax expenditures to promote business within a state. The main 
issue, of course, is the “race to the bottom” competition effect that may result when one state 
inspires economic growth seemingly at the cost of another state. See, e.g ., Peter D. Enrich, 
Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for 
Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 380 (1996); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 
276 (1984); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’r, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994).  
 56. § 135.405 (Supp. 1999). The ceiling would only come into effect as a limit on the 
amount of investment that was eligible for the tax credit. However, that would not make the 
remainder of he investment above the cap unauthorized in terms of an investment in the 
business. One can still invest; however, the investment may not be eligible for the tax credit 
under the Missouri Act. Another effect of exceeding the cap is the potential to rise above fifty 
percent beneficial ownership of the small business, thus making all funds invested ineligible for 
the credit. Id.  
 57. § 135.403 (Supp. 1999).  
The tax credit shall be evidenced by a tax credit certificate in accordance with the 
provisions of sections 135.400 to 135.430 and may be used to satisfy the state tax 
liability of the owner of the certificate that becomes due in the tax year in which the 
qualified investment is made, or in any of the ten tax years thereafter .  . . . No investor 
may receive a tax credit . . . unless that person presents a tax credit certificate to the 
department of revenue for payment of such state tax liability. The department of 
revenue shall grant tax credits . . . [and] certificates of tax credit issued in accordance 
with these sections may be transferred, sold or assigned by notarized endorsement 
thereof which names the transferee. 
Id. The goal of the tax expenditure is not affected by the alienability of the tax credit. See 
generally  this section. 
 58. The social justification of using a tax expenditure as opposed to other forms of 
government resource allocation is framed in the context of “public perceptions.” Peter J. 
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and economic growth over the long term, the Missouri Act’s tax 
expenditure particularly benefits the short-term goal of immediate 
economic stimulus.59 Additionally, the long-term implications, not 
discussed here, may bear on the governments’ choice of 
redevelopment tools.60 
A combination of two very visible factors embrace the legislative 
advantages of using the Missouri Act’s tax expenditure over a direct 
spending program.61 First, the importance of both an environment and 
a perception of free market development is crucial to sustained 
economic growth. An environment of free market growth 
significantly affects investor confidence and encourages the most 
efficient use of resources.62 Moreover, the apparent lack of 
government dependence could bolster the entrepreneur’s credibility 
in the eyes of potential investors. Secondly, the Missouri Act’s tax 
 
Wiedenbeck, Paternalism and Income Tax Reform , 33 U. KAN.  L. REV. 675, 679 (1985). 
Professor Wiedenbeck argues, effectively, that some important social goals cannot be achieved 
through direct spending as effectively as through a tax expenditure for four reasons: 
First . . . most taxpayers do not consider a tax allowance available to people at their 
income level to be a subsidy. Instead of seeing special tax allowances . . . as implicit 
expenditures of public funds, most taxpayers view such allowances as reduced 
government confiscation . Second, it is not understood generally that the long-term 
consequences of such selective tax reduction for one’s income peers is a higher tax 
burden for those who do not qualify for the allowance. Third, taxpayers understand 
that, absent cutbacks in other areas, their taxes must be raised in order to finance an 
explicit spending program. Fourth, an explicit subsidy designed to counteract the 
underuse of specific goods or services is likely to be viewed as a “give away” to the 
consumers of such goods and services, rather than as an expenditure which indirectly 
promotes the general welfare. 
Id. 
 59. The Missouri legislature’s ability to amend the statute to reflect the current level of 
desired spending under the Missouri Act and the ability to track the dollars spent via the issued 
certificates help to immediately assess the Missouri Act’s success. See MO. REV.  STAT. 
§ 135.403 (Supp. 1999). 
 60. See, e.g., NEW TOOLS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:  THE ENTERPRISE ZONE , 
DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND RFC (George Sternlieb & David Listokin eds., 1981). 
 61. A direct-spending program is a government budget line-item that is funded by a direct 
or indirect cash payment of tax revenue generated dollars. This is the more popularized and 
traditional way for Congress to exercise its taxing and spending power. See, e.g., SURREY & 
MCDANIEL, supra note 54. 
 62. See David M. Maloney, A Critical Analysis of the ‘Enterprise Zone’ Concept and its 
Application, 34 TAX NOTES 261, 274 n.58 (1987) (noting that “[a] given economic arrangement 
is efficient if there can be no rearrangement which will leave someone better off without 
worsening the position of others . . .. If . . . such a change is possible, then the prevailing 
arrangement is inefficient and an efficiency gain can be had by making the change.”).  
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expenditure provides reduced-risk capital targeted at the most 
important financing party in the start-up of a small business—the 
local investor. Whereas a direct spending program provides its funds 
directly to the small business, a tax expenditure can promote 
opportunistically the direction of resulting benefits to the investor, 
adding a powerful incentive to invest in the start-up. Because 
investments in small businesses are more akin to long-term 
partnerships than public stock investing, the difference in approach 
comes down to one question: Who, as a small business owner, would 
you like as a long-term partner, your community or your 
government? 
Notably, the Missouri Act’s tax credit, made available to 
investors, differs from other state tax credits which are made 
available directly to the small business as an organization.63 The 
Missouri Act tax credit represents an instant return on the investor’s 
capital, without regard to the type or extent of risk to which the 
investor is exposed. Of course, business risk and other investment-
related factors remain dominant considerations. Nonetheless, the 
Missouri Act gives the investor an additional incentive to consider 
the additional risk assumed in small and start-up business investing.64 
Thus, in terms of encouraging growth, a tax incentive aimed at 
encouraging the investors, who control the direction and allocation of 
 
 63. The Missouri Act provides the investor, in addition to the small business, the 
additional incentive to promote development. Strategically, as compared with a start -up tax 
credit  for the small business, a tax credit for the investor can provide overall tax savings earlier. 
See WILLIAM HAMILTON ET AL ., INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVES: PUBLIC PROMOTION OF PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE 118 (1985). 
In contrast to exemptions and deductions, which diminish the tax base for the 
company, credits may be subtracted from the tax due in reducing the actual tax 
payment. Credits, if large enough, may offset the total tax liability for the year, and 
under some state codes, may be carried forward and/or backward to be applied to 
income from other tax years.  
 The administration of tax credits, particularly income tax credits, presents a 
challenge to the state where it wishes to promote entrepreneurial activity, product 
development and the growth of small businesses in general. Credits are beneficial to a 
firm only if there is income to be offset by the credits. Many small companies that are 
in the start -up phases . . . do not generate significant net income, if any. To deliver 
incentive benefits to such firms from income tax credits the state must consider [other] 
options. 
Id. 
 64. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
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capital, arguably drives the redevelopment process more rapidly and 
efficiently. 65 
It is insightful to briefly discuss implementation when considering 
state or local policies like the Missouri Act.66 A major criticism 
levied on several government redevelopment activities is the extent 
of the government’s role in guiding or implementing the new 
activity. 67 Perhaps an equally persuasive criticism is the skepticism in 
state or federal government officials’ ability to adequately predict and 
shape market development, especially given that the urban region’s 
economic base is currently in disrepair.68 The relationship between 
the investor’s and entrepreneur’s skepticism and the strong and active 
hand of government in private business affairs is further amplified in 
the context of the capital and investment markets. The Missouri Act, 
however, reaches a reasonable compromise between the state’s 
objective, and market demands. Missouri’s use of a tax expenditure 
to effectively purchase risk away from local investors creates the 
atmosphere of free market mechanics and allows increased 
entrepreneur and investor control in matters concerning the small 
business.69 In substance, the Missouri Act attracts capital to small 
businesses with the most subtle of lures, all of which are directed at 
 
 65. Golden, supra note 1, at 246. Planners have used tax incentives: 
as a means of persuading private citizens and enterprises to invest in desired ways at 
desired times, and in desired locations. To encourage long-term investment, we tax 
capital gains at a ceiling of twenty-five percent. To encourage charitable contributions, 
we allow them to be deducted from current income. To encourage oil and mineral 
production, we offer depletion allowances. To encourage the building of grain storage 
facilities and defense plants, we have offered faster-than-normal depreciation rates. To 
encourage investment in capital goods, as opposed to inventory or consumption, we 
have allowed tax credits for such investment; suspended that credit when we wished to 
slow investment down; and reinstated it in order to speed investment up again. 
Id. at 246-47 (quoting R. KENNEDY, TO SEEK A NEWER WORLD 42-43 (1967)). 
 66. See, e.g ., TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, WHO BENEFITS FROM STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES? (1991). 
 67. Id. at 26-62. 
 68. One commentator posed the concern; “in the context of a dynamic, multiurban 
national economy, can local politicians and urban planners be expected to select and promote 
the best revitalization plans on a project-by-project, neighborhood-by-neighborhood 
basis . . . ?” Malloy, supra note 3, at 74. 
 69. If framed as “are revitalization efforts best realized by creating a foundation for 
market-directed revitalization based on an enhanced free flow of capital, technology, labor, and 
ideas?”, the answer would be in the affirmative. Id. 
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the investors. The Missouri Act accomplishes a balance between an 
environment of free-market economics and the Missouri legislature’s 
efforts to focus exclusively on small businesses in depressed urban 
cities. 
II. THE ENTERPRISE ZONE; FREE-MARKET MECHANICS SET FREE 
Before turning a critical eye toward the Missouri Act, it is useful 
to describe, in overview, the concept of the Enterprise Zone. Thirty 
states have enacted Enterprise Zone legislation as part of urban 
redevelopment efforts.70 Generally, the Enterprise Zone is an attempt 
to initiate economic growth in a legislatively-controlled business 
environment.71 The Enterprise Zone aims to initiate self-sustaining 
business and commerce development.72 Fierce debates surround the 
question of the success of Enterprise Zones in America and even the 
 
 70. Maloney, supra note 62, at 267. 
 71. David Boeck, The Enterprise Zone Debate, 16 URB. LAW. 71, 74-85 (1984). 
There is a consensus that federal urban programs have not achieved promised goals, 
and that a radically different approach to urban problems must be taken. Proponents 
believe it is difficult ot argue effectively against an enterprise zone program, since 
enterprise zones are proposed to supplement existing federal programs, not to replace 
them. The concept involves building on the effective elements of existing programs, 
rather than scrapping them and starting from nothing. 
 Proponents view taxation and government regulation as burdens that hinder 
entrepreneurship and stifle the innovative spirit. . . . The program is intended to create 
paradise in the inner city for the venturesome, free enterprise capitalist. 
 
Id. at 74-75. 
 72. Id. at 75. Enterprise Zone programs are designed for several specific reasons: 
[To] benefit . . . the low-income, unskilled, uneducated residents of inner cities by 
making them entrepreneurs. The concept requires confidence that there is considerable 
potential for economic development in the most depressed neighborhoods and that 
“apparently unsophisticated people” can succeed as entrepreneurs when given the 
appropriate incentives. The incentive is profit, made more readily available by 
removing governmental burden . . . .  
 The enterprise zone is not intended to guarantee success to each of these 
entrepreneurs, but to reduce unnecessary causes or failure . . . .  
 Enterprise zone objectives are several. Most importantly is a significant reduction of 
inner-city unemployment. The primary supplier of jobs will be small business. Local 
private enterprise will be encouraged and new jobs will come from an economic 
expansion. 
Id. See Madsen Pirie, A Short History of Enterprise Zones, NAT’L REV., Jan. 23, 1981, at 26; 
see, e.g., STUART M. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE ZONES GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES (1981). 
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standards for benchmarking the success of the programs.73 However, 
despite the great difficulty in identifying the success of the programs, 
it is not generally disputed that states employ Enterprise Zones with 
at least some success in cities around the country and even around the 
world. 74 
In an effort to stimulate economic growth in depressed urban 
centers, economists, sociologists, and urbanologists collaborated to 
develop the concept of the Enterprise Zone.75 The Enterprise Zone 
concept, originally tested in England,76 quickly spread throughout the 
western hemisphere.77 The United States implemented Enterprise 
Zones in depressed urban cities in an effort to foster economic 
growth with limited affirmative government stimulus.78 Essentially, 
an Enterprise Zone is a geographic area79 in a depressed urban center 
singled out by local or federal officials to receive special 
consideration. 80 This consideration typically is offered in the form of 
relaxed minimum wage laws, housing codes, building codes, 
reduction or elimination of state or federal income or capital gains 
tax, and a general lessening of burdensome and expensive municipal 
‘red tape.’81  
 
 73. BARTIK, supra  note 66, at 205-08. See, e.g., David L. Callies & Gail M. Tamashiro, 
Enterprise Zones: The Redevelopment Sweepstakes Begins, 15 URB. LAW. 231 (1983). 
 74. BARTIK, supra  note 66, at 207. 
 75. See, e.g ., Williams, supra note 15, at 712-22. President Ronald Reagan aptly summed 
up the goal of the Enterprise Zone in his 1982 State of the Union Address: “A broad range of 
special economic incentives in the [Enterprise] zones will help attract new business, new jobs, 
new opportunity to America’s inner cities …. Some will say our mission is to save free 
enterprise. Well, I say we must free enterprise so that, together, we can save America.” Ronald 
Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union 
(Jan. 26, 1982), reprinted in  I PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 72, 76 (1982).  
 76. Butler, supra  note 21, at 26-29. Peter Hall originally formulated the first formal 
Enterprise Zone plan in an outline entitled “Freeport.” Id. at 26. He designed the concept 
specifically for the inner cities. Id. at 26. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Maloney , supra note 62, at 262-63. 
 79. Enterprise Zones are defined by geographical boundaries, typically because the level 
of economic incentive is so burdensome to the state. Although the Missouri Act is a statewide 
initiative, Enterprise Zones remain valid comparisons.  
 80. Id. at 262-64. 
 81. Williams, supra note 15, at 720-22. At the state level, common incentives include: 
sales and use tax exemptions, a wage credit for job creation, an employer income tax 
credit, a credit for hiring certain disadvantaged workers, property tax reduction or 
abatement, and investment credit for real improvements. Other incentives include 
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The goal of an Enterprise Zone is to provide a geographically 
focused area where capital investment and community resources 
economically flourish amid reduced government interference.82 By 
removing regulatory obstacles, small businesses avoid the high cost 
and bureaucratic confusion often associated with start-up 
businesses.83 In a regulation-free climate, small businesses have a 
better chance for growth and survival. 84 The key to both the 
Enterprise Zone and the concept of entrepreneurial redevelopment, 
and, more pointedly, the critical missing element in the Missouri Act, 
is supported free-market enterprise and development.85 The 
Enterprise Zone does not dictate product or process type or industry 
requirements for start-up businesses in the Zone; rather, it lays an 
attractive foundation for a self-selecting variety of small businesses, 
inviting self-directed and independently sustainable economic 
growth.86 
 
availability of venture capital funds, tax increment financing, direct state loans, 
regulatory relief, . . . infrastructure improvement assistance . . . [and] small business 
incubators. 
Id. at 720-21. 
 82. Butler, supra note 21, at 35 (finding that “[r]educed to its essential foundations, the 
Enterprise Zone aims to stimulate businesses—especially small enterprises—in depressed 
central-city neighborhoods, by encouraging entrepreneurs to take the risk of setting up a 
business by removing unnecessary obstacles and reducing taxes.”).  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 40. 
 85. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
 86. Malloy, supra note 3, at 73-75. The policy question is succinctly posed as: 
in the context of a dynamic, multiurban national economy, can local politicians and 
urban planners be expected to select and promote the best revitalization plans on a 
project-by-project, neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis, or are revitalization efforts 
best realized by creating a foundation for market -directed revitalization based on an 
enhanced free flow of capital, technology, labor, and ideas? 
Id. at 73. Most importantly, the Enterprise Zone is: 
a recognition both that at least part of the urban crisis is due to government, and that 
success is more likely if the residents of a community are given a real chance to 
rebuild the commerce and housing of their neighborhood with a minimum of taxes and 
red tape. The Enterprise Zone imposes no blueprint and stifles no local idea. What it 
does do is to declare the blighted inner cities open neighborhoods, devoid of as many 
regulations and tax costs as possible, and to invite what may be called Urban 
Pioneering-the same kind of local projects and enterprise that once built countless 
successful communities across the continent. 
Butler, supra  note 21, at 41. 
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Enterprise Zones specifically target small business growth as the 
primary catalyst for economic turnaround in depressed urban 
business areas.87 It is axiomatic that more traditional redevelopment 
plans focus on attracting large corporations to depressed areas, while 
economic growth continues to stem mainly from small businesses.88 
By focusing on the creation and growth of small and start-up 
businesses, the Enterprise Zone revitalizes existing, but dormant local 
assets in an attempt to stimulate free-market forces.89 Much of the 
basic business infrastructure in an Enterprise Zone is in disarray, and 
small businesses are better equipped to make efficient use of 
confused, indigenous resources.90 Furthermore, small businesses are 
able to take advantage of resources and talent on a small scale more 
quickly and less expensively than large companies.91 Because small 
businesses are not capital intensive but are extremely capital 
sensitive, they use dollars available for investment more efficiently 
 
 87. Butler, supra  note 21, at 25. See also  Golden, supra  note 1, at 265 (concluding that 
“[t]he important factor in employment decline is not whether large businesses can be induced to 
move into the central city, but whether new businesses can be induced to begin operations 
there.”). One commentator aptly noted:  
The greatest economic problem of the inner city is the poor birthrate of businesses-and 
especially small businesses . . . . The best way of encouraging this sector is thus to 
remove obstacles in the path of the entrepreneur in the cities and to give these 
individuals the kind of business climate that will provide the incentive to take risks. 
Butler, supra  note 21, at 25.  
 88. Golden, supra  note 1, at 265. This commentator correctly observes that: 
The job generating firm tends to be small. It tends to be dynamic (or unstable, 
depending on your viewpoint)–the kind of firm than banks feel uncomfortable about. It 
tends to be young. In short, the firms that can and do generate the most [new] jobs are 
the ones most difficult to reach through conventional policy initiatives . . . . 
 The very spirit that gives them their vitality and job-creating powers is the same 
spirit that makes them unpromising partners for the development administrator. 
Id. See Maloney, supra  note 62, at 265. 
 89. Maloney , supra note 62, at 263. 
 90. Id. The basic premise is “that local residents are better able than outsiders to relieve 
local social and economic maladies, if given the opportunity.” Id. 
 91. Butler, supra  note 21, at 25.  
Neighborhood residents have shown themselves eager to put their own time, effort, 
and limited resources into housing rehabilitation if given genuine encouragement to do 
so. Rather than funding new projects, governments would achieve more if they created 
a climate in which essentially self-help projects would be more likely to succeed. 
Id.  
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than larger businesses. Small businesses utilize more of the untrained 
urban workforce due to the lower skill requirements for many 
positions, and more efficiently produce jobs as growth ensues.92 An 
Enterprise Zone is, at its core, a highly subsidized form of 
entrepreneurial redevelopment.93 However, as compared with the 
Missouri Act, the economic incentive for entrepreneurial 
redevelopment emphasizes an immediate return to the investor, as 
well as an environment of increased free-flowing capital to the small 
business.94 
III. THE ENTERPRISE ZONE MEETS THE MISSOURI ACT: “WHERE IS 
YOUR ENTREPRENEURIAL REDEVELOPMENT?” 
Like the Enterprise Zone, the Missouri Act recognizes the 
fundamental importance of small businesses in urban 
redevelopment.95 Enterprise Zones primarily depend on the job-
producing attributes of small businesses. The Missouri Act targets 
only those businesses still in their infancy, and thus, in this respect, 
the Missouri Act mirrors Enterprise Zones because it recognizes the 
important and indispensable role that start-up businesses play in local 
economic redevelopment.  
In fact, the Missouri Act seeks to create a type of state-wide 
Enterprise Zone, albeit with only one financial incentive, by way of 
the most important growth catalyst for small businesses—early, long-
term capital investment.96 The most obvious difference between 
 
 92. Butler, supra  note 21, at 25. Butler notes that small businesses “bring together local 
entrepreneurial talent and the young, unskilled workforce, and they play a crucial social role in 
the community.” Id. Maloney, supra  note 62, at 286. 
 93. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. 
 94. See supra note 7-11 and accompanying text. 
 95. The exclusively local nature of the small business is stressed heavily throughout the 
requirements of the Missouri Act. See, e.g., MO. REV.  STAT.  § 135.400(8) (Supp. 1999) 
(defining a “Missouri small business” as an “independently owned and operated business . . . 
which is headquartered in Missouri and which employs at least eighty percent of its employees 
in Missouri .  . . .”).  
 96. Although Missouri legislative history does not reveal a legislative intent to create an 
Enterprise Zone, it is instructive to note several provisions in the Missouri Act that pertain to 
additional tax credits for investments in to a “target area.” § 135.403 (Supp. 1999). A “target 
area” is defined in the Missouri Act as “a group of blocks or a self-defined neighborhood where 
the rate of poverty in the area is greater than twice the national poverty rate . . . .” § 135.400(13) 
(Supp. 1999). Investments in a “target area” provide the investor with a fifty percent tax credit. 
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Missouri’s approach and the Enterprise Zone is the financial 
incentive which attracts the investment to the business.97 The focus in 
an Enterprise Zone is on providing financial incentives to the small 
business owner; the Missouri Act places a preponderance of the 
financial incentives on the small business investor. Thus, the demand 
for tax-favored investment is on both sides of the transaction, as 
opposed to only on the entrepreneur’s side in an Enterprise Zone. In 
other words, investors will push capital investments into small 
businesses for the immediate return, in the form of a tax break, while 
entrepreneurs are pulling these investors and their capital investment 
by offering the tax break as a risk-reducing incentive to invest.98  
On the surface, the Missouri Act seems a distant cousin to the 
Enterprise Zone, at least in terms of the basic policy underpinnings 
like development incentives and deployment of small businesses. 
However, in one fatally flawed respect the Missouri Act is directly 
contradictory to the Enterprise Zone concept—the explicit industry 
restriction. By this restriction, the Missouri Act hinders the 
entrepreneurial redevelopment scheme clearly engendered in 
Enterprise Zones. The Missouri Act’s explicit industry restriction99 is 
perverse to the scheme of stimulating a revitalized free-market 
environment because the restriction ignores the Enterprise Zone’s 
most basic proposit ion—to encourage free-market, self-sustaining 
economic growth.100 
The Missouri Act premises its industry restriction clause on what 
is known as the “fixed pool” assumption.101 The fixed pool 
assumption, a common premise of modern economic redevelopment 
theory, engenders the notion that the number of new small and start-
up businesses to emerge in any given year is fixed. 102 Essentially, the 
 
MO. REV. STAT. § 135.403 (Supp. 1999). At least implicitly, one can gleam from the text of the 
statute an intent that the credit be used in the urban areas most needy. 
 97. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
 98. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. 
 100. Butler, supra  note 21, at 35. 
 101. Entrepreneurial redevelopment and programs such as Enterprise Zones are “not 
designed to create a zero sum game, where existing businesses move to the inner city leaving 
abandoned workers behind.” Boeck, supra note 71, at 75. 
 102. The ‘fixed-pool’ assumption leads policy makers to examine competing states in a 
‘race for the bottom’—an effort where states compete to attract start-up companies for other 
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assumption posits, economic and business market conditions in the 
United States will only produce a limited and predictable number of 
new start-up businesses in any given year.103 The fixed pool 
assumption often leads policy makers and local governments to face 
redevelopment problems with strategies to attract more of these 
annual small businesses from outside their respective geographic 
area–basically to affect a favorable redistribution of business 
activity. 104 Redevelopment programs that partially, or completely, 
ignore the importance of stimulating of new small business from 
within their borders, like the Missouri Act,105 premise their strategies 
on this assumption. 106  
Because of the “fixed pool” assumption, many current 
redevelopment programs focus solely on the entrepreneurs that will 
undoubtedly launch small businesses107 from outside the region or 
state.108 Neither this focus nor the assumption behind it rests squarely 
 
states with more favorable economic incentives. Enrich, supra note 55, at 400. “[A]rguments 
for state business incentives focus almost universally on incentives’ ability to influence the 
location of economic activity, not on their ability to affect the overall level of investment; 
incentives aim to redivide the pie, not to make it larger.” Id. at 398 n.110. Approaching 
economic redevelopment as a finite resource, to be divided among programs as a “pie,” may be 
where other economic redevelopment efforts fall short. Id. 
 103. Enrich, supra note 55, at 399. Consistent with this line of reasoning, states engage in 
massive attempts to attract businesses from other states in an effort to increase their own 
economic base. The effect on the states is:  
far worse than zero sum. For, although the states can expect to achieve no overall gain 
in business activity or jobs, they do incur a very substantial loss of tax revenues. Even 
a tax break that succeeds in attracting a business investment to a state will represent a 
net loss for the states collectively, as long as that investment .  . . would have occurred 
in some state in the absence of the incentive. 
Id. at 398-99. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. “In short, continuing interstate competition over incentives for businesses has 
reduced state taxation of mobile capital and has intensified the rivalry among the states for a 
finite pool of businesses and jobs, all without an appreciable effect on the interstate distribution 
of economic activity.” Id. at 401. 
 106. See, e.g ., DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992). 
 107. Id. at 190-201. 
 108. Based on the “fixed pool” assumption, policy makers embark on strategies to draw 
businesses of all types and sizes to a state for the purpose of increasing the st ate’s tax base. 
These “locations incentives” speak to a finite pool of resources, an assumption that Enterprise 
Zones clearly reject. The use of these “location incentives” to attract new business is beyond the 
scope of this article. But see, e.g., Kolesar, supra note 11, at 285. 
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on prevalent redevelopment theory or economic reality.109 In its 
defense, this erroneous premise makes for accurate economic 
comparisons that can easily sum up the benefits derived from the 
program simply by watching tax revenues.110 However, from an 
economic redevelopment perspective and as evidenced in the 
Missouri Act, the ‘fixed pool’ assumption is limiting and may lead to 
the wrong political, sociological, and economic result.111  
The “fixed pool” assumption implicit in the Missouri Act’s 
industry restriction leads to results that ignore some of the economic 
realities of urban redevelopment. The industry restriction assumes 
those sustainable firms in the product assembly and research and 
development industries will be first to “re-locate” to a depressed 
urban area in response to financial incentive.112 However, because the 
 
[T]he majority of commentators in this field have concluded that these contributions, 
especially when in the form of tax incentives, constitute such a minor role in the 
location decision, that they are essentially unnecessary expenditures that deplete 
government revenue sources and erode the level of government services, such as 
infrastructure improvement and education, factors acknowledged by most as playing a 
major role in the location decision. 
Id.  
 109. Theorists rest their conclusions on the “zero sum game” argument against economic 
development policy. BARTIK, supra  note 66, at 187. The argument posits “that development 
policies only redistribute jobs among state or local areas . . . [and] [t]he gains of the 
unemployed in one local area are offset by the losses of the unemployed in other local areas.” 
Id. However, the argument is easily questioned when the assumption of the fixed pool of 
ventures is rejected. The issue then becomes one of encouraging entrepreneurial productivity, 
which is not a “zero sum game.” Id. at 188. 
 110. Much of the important research necessary to validate any particular economic 
development project is missing. Maloney , supra note 62, at 274. However, “[t]he data and 
research relating to this issue appears to support the EZ [Enterprise Zone] concept, although the 
results are not overwhelming.” Id.  
 111. Id. It is important to clarify on what rational grounds this premise is so vehemently 
rejected. Some studies show that the number of start -up companies each year can be relatively 
constant from year to year. See, e.g., Small Business Association, Executive Summary: ACE-
Net (Angel Capital Electronic Network), at http://www.sba.gov/advo/acenet/report.html (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2001) (“The total number of entrepreneurial companies receiving investment 
from institutional venture capital funds remains fairly small and relatively constant. In 1987, the 
NVCA venture funds invested in 1,737 companies; in 1991 the total was 791 companies; in 
1993 it was 938 companies; and in 1995 it was 1,090 companies.”). But this is not evidence that 
the pool of ‘potential’ start-ups is fixed; rather, it serves only to indicate how the current 
entrepreneurial financial system effectively maintains the number receiving investment constant 
each year.  
 112. It is doubtful that the Missouri Act intended anything other than an attempt to attract 
smaller, heavy manufacturing and production companies from outside the region. See Maloney, 
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area is already depressed, it is probably void of successful industry 
counterparts, suppliers, support services, qualified staff, and 
amenities.113 Further, as evidenced in Enterprise Zones, sustainable 
high-tech and manufacturing intensive firms are not the small 
businesses initially to seek out a depressed urban area.114 In this 
manner, the Missouri Act’s industry restriction exemplifies putting 
the cart before the horse. While small professional service, retail, and 
other consulting–type businesses that can more ably take advantage 
of the limited resources in a flagging urban area are targeted by 
Enterprise Zones,115 these industries do not qualify for the Missouri 
Act’s incentives as the result of the industry restriction.116 The 
premise of the Missouri Act’s industry restriction is the fixed pool 
assumption, and therefore it focuses almost exclusively on attracting 
business. As such, the Missouri Act does not aim to generate 
additional small businesses,117 but rather attempts to attract small 
manufacturing-intensive firms from outside the state to relocate in an 
intra-state depressed urban region. 
This argument is not to imply that the Missouri Act is completely 
noneffectual. However, the Missouri Act does not lend itself to 
developing a sustainable free-market environment in which small 
businesses can develop independent of additional subsidies at 
inception. The success of providing incentives to relocate businesses 
is doubtful at best and, certainly from a practical standpoint, much 
more difficult for local residents to rally behind and finance.118 
 
supra note 62, at 262-65.  
 113. That is not to say that the area is desolate. Rather, the area contains resources that only 
certain businesses are in a position to take advantage of. Heavy manufacturing and high-tech 
internet start-ups are not in such a position. Id. at 274 (discussing Pareto efficiency at the 
service business level). 
 114. Id. at 264-65. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., Maloney, supra  note 62, at 270-71. 
 118. See generally this part. 
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CONCLUSION 
The “fixed pool” assumption that led to the industry restriction in 
the Missouri Act is self-defeating and prevents entrepreneurial 
redevelopment. However, if policy makers reject the “fixed pool” 
assumption, as argued for here, then they properly may reject the 
industry restriction in the Missouri Act as well. A more appropriate 
“free-market” clause, allowing investors to pour much-needed capital 
into any small or start-up business in the urban region that meets the 
size and capitalization requirements of the Missouri Act should 
replace the industry restriction. 
This change would result in an economic development program in 
Missouri that uses entrepreneurial redevelopment on a statewide 
level, targeting numerous urban areas and producing growth under 
free-market conditions in a sustainable manner.119 Once freed of the 
restrictive nature of industry requirements, local economies could 
focus on creating new entrepreneurial opportunities by opening 
channels to outside equity investments, lured by risk-reduced 
investing and the instant return inherent in a tax credit. Armed with 
the Missouri Act, investors in the state of Missouri could team with 
entrepreneurs to produce sustainable businesses that take full 
advantage of existing resources in resurgent urban areas.  
 
 119. “Many . . . programs do not assist start -up businesses with one of their most pressing 
needs, that of start up capital.” Maloney, supra  note 62, at 272. 
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